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Wittgenstein and the philosophical significance of not solving the paradoxes 
 
The standard question about the semantic paradoxes is how we should solve them. Wittgenstein raised a different 
question: whether we should solve them. In this paper, I argue that we have two reasons to take the question raised by 
Wittgenstein seriously. First, reflecting on the question posed by Wittgenstein might free us from a philosophical ideal, 
the assumption that we should reason according to strictly valid logical principles, in the sense of Hofweber (2008, 2009). 
Second, reflecting on Wittgenstein’s question might lead us to realize a possibly obvious, but important, point: the fact 
that several logical principles are jointly inconsistent does not show that one of them is more problematic than the others, 
for the same reason why the fact that several plans of action are jointly inconsistent does not show that one of them is 
more problematic than the others. 
 
1. Introduction 
How to solve semantic paradoxes like the Liar paradox or Curry’s Paradox is an open problem. 
Different logicians defend different solutions to the semantic paradoxes (see Murzi and Carrrara 2014 
for an overview). However, those involved in the project of solving the paradoxes apparently share 
an assumption: that it is important to solve the paradoxes. That assumption is rarely challenged, but it 
might be challenged. Ludwig Wittgenstein might be read as challenging it: 
 
If anyone should think he has solved the problem of life and feel like telling himself that everything is quite easy 
now, he can see that he is wrong just by recalling that there was a time when this “solution” had not been 
discovered; but it must have been possible to live then too and the solution which has now been discovered 
seems fortuitous in relation to how things were then. And it is the same in the study of logic. If there were a 
“solution” to the problems of logic (philosophy) we should only need to caution ourselves that there was a time 
when they had not been solved (and even at that time people must have know how to live and think).  
Wittgenstein 1980, p. 4e 
 
I read this passage as a suggestion to downplay the importance of solving the paradoxes. A related 
point that Wittgenstein made is that paradoxes are harmless; they do not pose any special problem for 
our standard linguistic practices: 
 
Is there any harm in the contradiction that arises when someone says: “I am lying. - So I am not lying. - 
So I am lying. - etc.”? I mean: does it makes our language less usable if in this case, according to the 
ordinary rules, a proposition yields its contradictory, and vice versa? 
Wittgenstein 1978, Appendix III, 12, p.120 
 
The two ideas fit together nicely: if paradoxes do not threaten our linguistic practices, we do not need 
to solve them.  
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In this paper, I argue that we have two reasons to take seriously the question whether we really need 
to solve the paradoxes. 
 
First, reflecting on such a question might free us from a philosophical ideal, the assumption that we 
should reason according to strictly valid logical principles, in the sense of Hofweber (2008, 2009).  
 
Second, reflecting on Wittgenstein’s question might lead us to realize a possibly obvious, but 
significant, point: the fact that several logical principles are jointly inconsistent does not show that 
one of them is more problematic than the others, for the same reason why the fact that several plans 
of action cannot be jointly executed does not show that one of them is more problematic than the 
others. The following two sections of the paper elaborate upon these two themes.  
 
The goal of this paper is to argue that a certain reading of Wittgenstein suggests a legitimate and 
interesting point, not to carefully reconstruct Wittgenstein’s position concerning the paradoxes. 
However, in the last section of the paper, I argue that the points that I make in this paper are in 
harmony with many remarks made by Wittgenstein concerning the right attitude to take with respect 
to the paradoxes.  
 
1. The ideal of deductive logic 
Semantic paradoxes have the form of a piece of reasoning such that each of its steps seems 
perfectly acceptable, but whose conclusion is unacceptable. It is usually assumed that a solution to 
the semantic paradoxes should do at least one thing: isolate the wrong inferential step or the wrong 
premise in the reasoning that leads from apparently acceptable premises to an unacceptable 
conclusion through apparently correct inferential steps (see Haack (1978, 138-139)).  
 
It is a good question how exactly we should reconstruct the paradoxes. What are the inferential 
steps? What are the assumptions involved? The problem with these questions, as Visser (1989, 624) 
notes, is that “What the real assumptions involved in the proof are, will depend on what the true 
solution of the paradox is”. A reconstruction of Curry’s paradox like the one offered in Hofweber 
(2009), for instance, gives the impression that the only principles involved in the paradoxical 
derivation are the rules of classical logic and the ‘naïve’ rules for the truth predicate. However, 
according to other reconstructions of the Curry/Liar paradox (see Ripley 2013), we should recognize 
that classical logic is perfectly compatible with the naïve truth rules and that the paradox is triggered 
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by an additional assumption: the transitivity of the relation of logical consequence (which Ripley 
does not count as part of classical logic). 
 
However interesting the debate about how to reconstruct the semantic paradoxes could be, I do 
not want to enter into it. The point I want to draw attention to holds even if we admit that the task of 
reconstructing the paradoxes is connected to the task of solving them. For the purpose of this paper, I 
am happy to add to the list of the principles that are involved in the paradox the usual suspects: rules 
of inferences for the connectives, naïve rules for the truth predicate, structural properties of the 
relation of logical consequence, etc. I am also not interested in discussing the question whether the 
rules governing the truth predicate should count as logical principles (Priest 2007, Cook 2012): I will 
speak of semantic/logical principles to remain neutral. 
 
The point I am interested in is: no matter how you reconstruct the paradoxical reasoning, none of 
the assumptions involved stands out as clearly incorrect; on the contrary, each one of them seems 
perfectly natural and correct. If solving the paradoxes means finding the wrong step in the 
paradoxical reasoning, then we did not solve the paradoxes (yet). However, our failure to solve the 
paradoxes did not jeopardize our linguistic and inferential practices. It did not make “our language 
less usable” as Wittgenstein said in the quote above. How is that possible? The point I want to 
elaborate upon might be presented in the form of (an admittedly crude) argument: 
 
P1. If something constitutes a real problem, failure to solve it would have undesirable 
consequences. 
P2. Failure to solve the logical paradoxes did not have any undesirable consequence. 
C. The logical paradoxes constitute no real problem. 
 
Coming to the same point from a different angle. The reaction of ordinary reasoners in front 
of the paradoxes is what Hofweber (2008) rightly calls the natural reaction: rejecting the conclusion 
of the argument without rejecting any of the rules involved in the paradoxical reasoning, that is doing 
exactly the opposite of what a solution to the paradoxes should do, according to Haack (1978, 138-9). 
The natural reaction worked: how is that possible? 
 
The solution to the problem of accounting for the success of the natural reaction, in my view, 
lies in a distinction that Hofweber (2008) makes. We can distinguish two senses in which a rule of 
inference can be said to be valid (see also Hofweber 2009, p. 18): 
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1. Strict validity: each instance of the rule is truth preserving 
2. Generic validity: instances of the rule are in general truth preserving, but there might be 
exceptions 
 
Generic statements tolerate exceptions, which means that generic validity is weaker than strict 
validity. Despite this, its force should not be underestimated. According to (2), the sense, in which we 
can say that rules of inference are valid, is the same sense in which we ordinarily say that bears are 
dangerous. When we say that bears are dangerous, we mean it in a generic sense: we don’t 
completely rule out the possibility of a non-dangerous bear. But this does not mean that properly 
speaking bears are not really dangerous: they are, and it is a good policy to run away from them. 
Similarly, saying that rules are valid in a generic sense doesn’t mean that they are not really valid: 
they are, and we are entitled to infer according to them. 
 
The first point I want to stress is that the recognition of the generic validity of our rules of 
inference offers a solution to the puzzle of the efficacy of the natural reaction. According to the 
generic conception of validity, the problematic instances of the rules are exceptional cases 
encountered only in the philosophy room, which do not threaten the validity of the rules of inference 
in normal cases. Normal cases are most cases, which means that the rules are valid in the generic 
sense and we are entitled to believe the conclusion of an argument that relies on them. This is why 
the natural reaction works: setting aside few exceptions, ordinary rules of inference are valid and that 
is enough to make them usable.  
 
The way in which generically valid rules can be used is as default rules. In default reasoning 
we are entitled to believe the conclusion of a valid inference, but we are also allowed to take back the 
conclusion if further information emerges and disproves it. Good default rules need not be strictly 
valid.  
 
They still need to be generically valid, though. Just consider how many troubles would cause 
an inferential practice based on affirming the consequent (AC). Surely, there are instances of AC that 
are truth preserving, but they are hardly the norm: AC is not valid and thus we should not reason 
according to it. If our rules of inference were not generically valid we would not be entitled to believe 
the conclusions we draw applying them.  
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If our rules were not generically valid, revising them would be mandatory. This suggests that 
in order to account for the fact that not revising logic did not cause troubles we should recognize that 
our ordinary rules of inference are generically valid. The generic validity of our logical rules should 
thus be common ground. 
 
Logical paradoxes showed us that our rules could not be all strictly valid.  The natural 
reaction to the semantic paradoxes consists in simply accepting the situation and learning to live with 
valid rules that are not strictly valid. Logical revisionism, on the other hand, is the attempt to replace 
our only-generically-valid rules with strictly valid rules. This difference should not obliterate a point 
of contact between the two views: just as friends of the natural reaction admit that our rules are not 
strictly valid, so logical revisionists should concede that they are nonetheless generically valid. 
 
In fact, they do concede that. Graham Priest (2006, Ch. 8), for instance, while advocating the 
adoption of a non-classical (paraconsistent) logic, addresses the problem of accounting for the 
success of classical logic in ordinary circumstances, despite its invalidity. His answer is that classical 
rules are quasi-valid, i.e. valid in all cases in which we are dealing with propositions that are not both 
true and false (so-called dialetheias). In consistent contexts, in which no dialetheias are 
involved, Priests’ paraconsistent logic behaves like classical logic. Priest recognizes that consistent 
contexts are the norm: dialetheias are very few. So it seems that even Priest should accept the generic 
validity of classical rules: these rules are valid in general, even though there can be few instances of 
such rules (those involving dialetheias) that are not truth-preserving. 
 
Priest’s use of expressions such as “presuppositions” (2006, p. 115) and “default 
assumptions”  (p. 117) when talking about classical logic is telling: as we have seen, generically valid 
rules can be successfully employed in default reasoning. And Priest seems happy to concede that 
ordinary reasoning can be safely employed in default reasoning. 
 
Once we recognize that our logical principles are all generically valid and that generic 
validity is all we need for our linguistic and logical practices to be in order, we might free ourselves 
from what Hofweber (2008) labels the ideal of deductive logic, the assumption that our rules of 
inference need to be strictly valid to be valid at all. 
 
In this section I argued that (i) reflecting on the question raised by Wittgenstein’s remark, 
whether we should really solve the paradoxes, suggests a puzzle, the puzzle of explaining the success 
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of the natural reaction to the paradoxes and that (ii) the best solution to this puzzle is to abandon the 
ideal of deductive logic.  
 
Hofweber (2009, p. 9) himself uses an argument virtually identical to the one I reconstructed 
in this section to motivate the abandon of the ideal of deductive logic. I think the argument deserves 
consideration and that we should credit Wittgenstein for suggesting it.  
 
Hofweber presents additional arguments to support the abandonment of the ideal of deductive 
logic (Hofweber 2007, 2008), including one based on revenge paradoxes, one based on the 
impossibility of proving the strict validity of one’s favorite rules of inference (see Field 2008) and 
one based on the existence of apparent counterexamples to standard rules of inference such as modus 
ponens (McGee 1995). I will not discuss these arguments in this paper. I am content to point out that 
we should credit Wittgenstein for the suggestion of the argument against the ideal of deductive logic 
based on the efficacy of the natural reaction.  
In the next section I want to focus on a different way to defend the rationality of the natural 
reaction. 
 
3. Semantic paradoxes and collective tragedies 
In this section I am going to use the notion of collective tragedy, introduced by Agustin Rayo, to 
offer an analysis of the semantic paradoxes. Collective tragedies, in Rayo’s definition (Rayo 2019, p. 
67), are situations where several agents all act rationally and yet the result of their collective action is 
bad for everyone. Something goes wrong, but there is no one to blame. I want to suggest an analogy 
between this kind of situations and the case, exemplified by the paradoxes, in which several logical 
principles cannot be coherently combined together. Also in this case, I suggest, the failure to combine 
the principles does not indicate that one of them is more problematic than the others.  
 
I will use a definition of collective tragedy slightly different from that of Rayo. A collective 
tragedy, for me, is a setup where several individually consistent plans of action cannot be combined 
in a consistent plan (a plan of action is consistent when the assumption that such a plan has been 
executed is consistent). Yablo (2000) presents a very simple example of a collective tragedy in my 
sense: if my plan is to choose a positive integer larger than yours and your plan is to choose a 
positive integers larger than mine, then our individually coherent plans cannot be coherently 
combined. 
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Here is a more elaborated example, also due to Yabo, of collective tragedy in my sense. Just like 
Rayo’s examples, it involves a backward omega-sequence: a sequence composed of denumerably 
many agents where agent number n+1 precedes agent number n, so that agent zero is the last element 
of the sequence, agent one the penultimate, etc.  Suppose that the plan for each agent is: to choose a 
(natural) number larger than the number chosen by her predecessor. Each individual plan of action 
can be executed: if agent n+1 chooses m, then agent n can choose m+1. However, the supposition 
that all the individual plans have been executed is inconsistent, given that it entails the existence of 
an infinitely descending chain of natural numbers, starting from the number chosen by agent 0, 
continuing with the number chosen by agent 1, the number chosen by agent 2, … 
 
It is worth noting a feature of this example: suppose that the initial collective strategy of the 
agents is to carry out each of their individual plans. Realizing that such a strategy is inconsistent, they 
might look for a different strategy, that of executing only some individual plans. The natural thought 
is to try to maximize the number of individual plans that are executed. The bad news is that this is 
impossible: the individual plans of a sub-group of agents can all be realized exactly when there are 
finitely many agents in that sub-group; but there is no larger finite set of agents. However many plans 
are executed, it could have been possible to execute more. If a solution to the problem of consistently 
combining the original plans consists in choosing only a finite number of plans to execute, then there 
is no optimal solution to the collective tragedy under consideration. Some collective tragedies do not 
have an optimal solution. 
 
 Another illustration of a collective tragedy in my sense is provided by a group of 32 agents 
where each agent is in charge of choosing the shape of one face of a polyhedron. The plan of each 
agent is that the face assigned to her be a hexagon. It is impossible to realize all of the individual 
plans, on account of Euler polyhedron formula. However, each individual plan is perfectly realizable 
(actually, 20 out of 32 plans can be realized). I cite this example because it is similar to one used by 
Visser (1989, 624) to illustrate a point that is similar to the one I want to make: 
 
perhaps there is no true solution [to the semantic paradoxes], maybe we should be content with a number of 
ways to block the paradox, the choice among which is to be governed by local considerations of utility and 
simplicity. Maybe language is like the skeleton of Aulonia Hexagona: there is no way to make it what it 
should be, a regular polygon, without giving up the original plan. (Visser 1989, 624) 
 
I agree that we should take seriously the possibility that there is no true solution to the paradoxes, 
because no assumption involved in the paradox is more sacred than any of the others. I would add 
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that there is not even an obligation to choose one among the many, equally legitimate, ways to block 
the paradox. We can simply adopt the natural reaction and reject the conclusion of the paradox, 
without indicating at which step the paradoxical reasoning goes wrong. 
 
I want to suggest an analogy between collective tragedies and situations in which a single agent 
has several plans of actions that are individually consistent but jointly inconsistent. The key is “to 
think of an agent as a collective” (Rayo 2019, 69) composed of several sub-agents, each with her own 
plan.  
 
Extending the notion of collective tragedy to cases where a single agent is involved allows us to 
see the logical/semantic paradoxes as a kind of collective tragedy. The relevant plans of action, in my 
case, are to respect certain logical/semantic principles: one plan is to reason according to the rules of 
classical logic, one is to use the truth predicate following the naïve truth rules, one is to accept 
standard structural rules like cut and contraction, etc. What the paradoxes show is that there is no way 
to execute all of these plans, i.e. to accept each and every instance of the standard logical and 
semantic principles without accepting completely implausible conclusions.  
 
However, it is perfectly natural to react to this situation by giving up all of the original plans and 
replacing each of them with a more modest goal: to apply a logical/semantic principle in most cases, 
use it as a default rule and be content with reasoning according to a generically valid principle. This 
would be analogous to the case where a group of agents decides to cover with hexagons only some 
faces of a polyhedron.  
 
Summing up: I have argued that logical/semantic paradoxes are a kind of collective tragedy. If 
this is correct, the right reaction to the logical/semantic paradoxes should be the proper reaction in 
front of a collective tragedy. The right reaction in front of a collective tragedy is to realize that no 
individual plan is responsible for the tragedy. Analogously, the right reaction in front of the 




4. Wittgenstein and the attitude towards the paradoxes 
Wittgenstein declared that his main goal, in discussing the semantic paradoxes, was to change 
(what he took to be) the prevailing attitude towards them (see Wittgenstein 1978, III, 82, p. 213). The 
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attitude that Wittgenstein wanted to contrast was that of seeing the paradoxes as a problem that needs 
to be fixed, “the superstitious dread…in front of the contradiction”(Wittgenstein 1978, App. III, 17, 
p. 122); the fear that if our principles have paradoxical consequences, then this makes them useless 
(see Wittgenstein 1978, VII, 15-16 pp. 374-8). The same attitude drives the attempt to find a proof of 
consistency, i.e. a guarantee that new paradoxes are not going to arise in the future (see Marconi 
1984, section II).   
 
Wittgenstein recommended a different way to look at the paradoxes, according to which the 
source of the paradoxes is simply our inability to foresee all the possible cases in which the rules 
governing the use of certain concepts/words might be applied (see for instance Wittgenstein 1978, III 
79, p. 207). Marconi (1984, p. 348) summarizes Wittgenstein’s position like this:  
 
The contradiction shows that our concepts are not as well-determined as we would like them to be, i.e., 
with respect to all their conceivable uses. In certain applications they may turn out to be overdetermined, 
in others, underdetermined. (Marconi 1984, p. 348) 
 
The relaxed attitude towards the paradoxes that Wittgenstein recommended is nicely captured by 
the following passage from Hansel Curry (quoted in Marconi 1984, p. 333): 
 
The presentation of the paradoxes…which was made in the universal language, has led many persons to 
assert that the universal language is inconsistent. So it is, if carelessly used, and carelessness would be 
expected to cause trouble in any kind of activity. (Curry 1963) 
 
The attitude recommended by Curry resembles very much the attitude of those who take the 
natural reaction (in the sense of Hofweber 2008, see above) as the right reaction to the paradoxes. 
Wittgenstein seems to endorse such an attitude when he describes a situation where people discover 
the paradoxes but don’t get “excited about it” (Wittgenstein 1978 VII 15, p. 376). 
 
 I think there is also a striking similarity between the way in which Hofweber formulates the 
puzzle of the efficacy of the natural reaction discussed in section 2 and Wittgenstein’s insistence, in 
his discussions with Turing reported in the Lectures On The Foundations of Mathematics that the 
presence of inconsistent rules in a calculus never created any practical problem: 
 
[…] one of the most puzzling features of the paradoxes: why they are in fact no problem whatsoever. 
No damage has ever been done by them outside of a philosophy department. No planes fell out of the 
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sky because of them, no money was ever lost, no one was confused into believing that Santa exists 
because of them. But why not?  
(Hofweber 2009, p. 9) 
 
Turing: Although you do not know that the bridge will fall if there are no contradictions, yet is almost 
certain that if there are contradictions it will go wrong somewhere. 
Wittgstein: But nothing has ever gone wrong that way yet. And why has it not? 
(Wittgenstein 1976, lecture XXII, p. 218) 
 
My main aim in this paper has been to show that there are two simple (minded) arguments to 
defend (something close to) Wittgenstein’s position: one based on the problem of accounting for the 
success of the natural reaction and one based on the simple observation that the impossibility to 
consistently combine several plans of action does not show that one of them is more problematic than 
the others. 
 
There might be arguments different from the ones considered here that support Wittgenstein’s 
position concerning the paradoxes. For instance, one might try to invoke Wittgenstein’s rule 
following considerations to argue that our past use of a rule (of inference) does not determine how we 
should apply the same rule in the future.  However, the rule following considerations are a Pandora’s 
box that I would rather not open. The interest of the present discussion is that we can support 
(something close to) Wittgenstein’s position using argument that do not use any specifically 
Wittgensteinian assumption.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I discussed a neglected puzzle about semantic paradoxes. Semantic paradoxes 
present us with a puzzling situation: we face an argument that leads to an unacceptable conclusion, 
but we cannot point out at which step the reasoning goes wrong. This seems to be a big problem: 
apparently, it shows that some basic principle of reasoning we ordinarily rely upon is invalid and 
should therefore be given up, but it is not clear which of the principles involved in the paradox is the 
invalid one.  
 
However, semantic paradoxes present us with a meta-puzzle when we realize that our inability to 
solve the first puzzle was actually not a big problem. In ordinary reasoning, we seem to have 
completely ignored the moral of the semantic paradoxes: we did not renounce to any of the principles 
involved in the Curry or Liar paradox. This should have been a problem, but it was not. I argued that 
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we should give Wittgenstein credit for formulating this meta-paradox, because reflecting on such a 
meta-paradox is a fruitful exercise. 
 
Reflecting on this meta-paradox might lead us to realize that the semantic paradoxes only show 
that our logical and semantic principles can not all be strictly valid, but that is not a problem as long 
as they are generically valid, as argued by Hofweber (2008, 2009). I think this should put some 
pressure on the idea that the paradoxes show that our ordinary semantic and logical principles are in 
need of revision, a cherished theme in the literature on conceptual engineering (Scharp 2013). In this 
paper I have been arguing that our logical and semantic principles do not need to be fixed or replaced 
with different ones. We can use them in a fruitful way, despite their allegedly problematic features.  
 
The view defended here, that we do not need to replace our logical and semantic principles with 
new ones, is compatible with the view that exploring ways to replace our logical/semantic principles 
with new ones is extremely interesting. Shapiro (2014, p. 318) interprets the attempt to replace our 
ordinary inconsistent logical principles with new consistent ones as an optimization project. I have 
argued that optimization projects are not always mandatory, but I think they are extremely interesting 
and potentially illuminating. For instance, I am attracted to the view, attributed to Gödel, that the so-
called set-theoretical paradoxes show that our ordinary notion of property is inconsistent, but they do 
not show that the mathematical notion of set is inconsistent (see Field, 2008, Introduction, for 
discussion)1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this position on the set-theoretical 
paradoxes, but I think it is worth mentioning it to show that the considerations developed in this 
paper are not in principle opposed to conceptual engineering. 
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